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Moving Beyond Traditional Sponsorships:
Understanding the Structure and Dynamics of Minority Equity Sponsorship Agreements
Abstract
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to understand the structure and dynamics of minority
equity sponsorship agreements and the motivations for organizations to go beyond traditional
sponsorships by acquiring minority equity in the sponsored organization.
Design/methodology approach - This paper adopts a qualitative methodology and presents
interview data from key actors involved in minority equity sponsorship agreements.
Findings - The findings of the paper include major characteristics of minority equity sponsorship
agreements including the motivations, dynamics, and resources exchanged by sponsoring firms
and clubs in these relationships, based on the experiences of key actors from firms, clubs, and
other key stakeholders, and a conceptual model for forming and maintaining these relationships.
Practical implications – Sponsorships are increasingly evolving into minority equity
sponsorship agreements, particularly in the European market. The findings of this study assist
sponsoring firms and the executives of clubs in better understanding the dynamics and
stakeholder-related consequences of these relations.
Originality/value: The findings of this paper illustrate the differences between minority equity
sponsorship agreements and both traditional sponsorships and minority equity alliances. The
findings also identify major characteristics of these relationships and the interdependencies
among these characteristics.
Keywords: Minority equity sponsorship agreements, Marketing alliances, Sponsorship,
Exchange theory, Relationship marketing
Paper type: Research paper
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1.

Introduction
Sponsorship has long been considered as a viable marketing strategy, utilized as a means

to broaden the visibility and recognition of the sponsoring brand (Mazodier, Henderson, and
Beck, 2018; Nickell, Cornwell, and Johnston, 2011). These marketing agreements generally
consist of a firm paying a sum of money or value-in-kind (VIK) products/services to acquire
certain rights to associate their brand with an organization, event, or individual and are
considered traditional contract-based alliances (Groza, Cobbs, and Schaefers, 2012). Recently,
some sponsorship arrangements have evolved into equity-based relationships, as they began to
involve the acquisition of minority equity share below 50% (Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009). To
date, a number of firms across a variety of industries have engaged in minority equity
sponsorship agreements, including Nintendo, Volkswagen, Red Bull, Adidas, Allianz, Evonik,
and Bayer AG, indicating that this is not an isolated phenomenon.
Although sponsorships align the firm and the organization being sponsored, these
minority equity sponsorship agreements tie the two together in a more substantial manner, due to
the equity being acquired by the sponsoring firm. While traditional sponsorships are considered
contract-based marketing alliances (Farrelly and Quester, 2005; Urriolagoitia and Planellas,
2007), the equity stake in these minority equity sponsorship agreements bring them closer to
equity-based strategic alliances (Das and Teng, 2000). In other words, while minority equity
sponsorship agreements display similarities to both traditional sponsorships and minority equity
alliances, given their unique composition these agreements may be different from both. Although
there is significant multidisciplinary scholarly attention given to minority equity alliances (e.g.,
Devarakonda and Reuer, 2019; Drees et al., 2013; Reuer and Tong, 2010) as well as to
traditional sponsorships (Cornwell and Kwon, 2020; Jensen and Cornwell, 2017; 2021), there is
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a dearth of attention on the more recent trend of minority equity sponsorship agreements,
revealing a need for research on the motivations, dynamics, and resources exchanged in these
relationships. Accordingly, how then are minority equity sponsorship agreements planned and
implemented in the experiences of involved organizations and their stakeholders? To answer this
research question, we adopt exchange theory and relationship marketing (RM) perspectives and
explore the characteristics of minority equity sponsorships including the motivations, dynamics
(such as trust, reputation, and commitment), and resources exchanged in these relations.
Minority equity sponsorship agreements in the German Bundesliga (the premier
professional football league in Germany) provide a fertile context for examining our research
question, given that more than half of all the clubs are engaged in these agreements (KPMG,
2020). In this context, we adopt a qualitative methodology and interview key actors for forming
and maintaining minority equity sponsorship agreements, including representatives from both
sponsoring firms and the sponsored organizations, external stakeholders such as employees of
participating law firms and advertising agencies, as well as local faculty specializing in these
agreements. Based on our analysis of data capturing the experiences of these key actors, we then
develop a conceptual model of minority equity sponsorship agreements, detailing the
motivations, dynamics, and resources exchanged in these relations.
The findings of this study contribute to the academic literature in a number of ways. We
contribute to the research building on exchange theory (McNally and Griffin, 2007) and the RM
paradigm (Dorai and Varshney, 2012; Morgan and Hunt, 1994) by adopting these as lenses to
study minority equity sponsorship agreements. Specifically, based on our comparison of
traditional sponsorships and minority equity alliances, we note the differences of minority equity
sponsorship agreements and explore a set of questions informed by exchange theory and RM to
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identify major characteristics related to the motivations, dynamics, and resources exchanged in
these agreements. Moreover, we follow the recent suggestions in RM (Cobbs, 2011; Cornwell,
Howard-Grenville, and Hampel, 2018) to extend beyond the dyadic partners and explore the
roles of other key stakeholders for each partner in establishing and maintaining these agreements.
We also contribute to the research on sponsorships (Brochado, Dionísio, and Leal, 2018;
Cobbs, Jensen, and Tyler, 2021; Nickell, Cornwell, and Johnston, 2011) which called for more
research on managerial decision-making and on facets of the sponsorship process previously
ignored by researchers. Our focus on decision-makers in firms and clubs engaged in the recent
and under-researched phenomenon of minority equity sponsorship agreements helps us to both
respond to this call and make a meaningful contribution to the sponsorship-linked marketing
literature. Finally, our findings contribute to the literature on strategic and marketing alliances
(Agostini and Nosella, 2017; Gomes, Barnes, and Mahmood, 2016) by offering insights
regarding the differences of minority equity sponsorship agreements from traditional
sponsorships and minority equity alliances and studying a different economic context (i.e.,
sponsorship) between non-traditional organizations (i.e., firms and clubs) which are important
gaps in the recent literature (Devarakonda and Reuer, 2019; Piaskowska, Nadolska, and
Barkema, 2019). This paper proceeds as follows: we begin with the theoretical background for
our study, followed by the data and methods. We continue with the results of the study and
conclude with a discussion of implications of our findings for future research.
1.1. Theoretical Background
1.1.1. Exchange Theory and Relationship Marketing (RM)
The relationship between a sponsoring firm and a sponsored organization is commonly
understood to be undergirded by exchange theory (McCarville and Copeland, 1994). In applying
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exchange theory to sponsorship relationships, Dees (2011) explained that exchange theory is
foundational to the relationship between both entities. Generally, there are two conditions that
must exist for the relationship to be considered an exchange: two or more parties must be
involved and the potential resources that may be exchanged between the two parties must be of
some value (Dees, 2011). The tenets of exchange theory suggest that if either of these two
distinct, yet interrelated, conditions are not in place, then a true exchange relationship will not
exist (Dees, 2011). Exchange theory is based on the underlying concept that a successful
exchange between two parties is dependent on an agreement from both sides of the relationship
that the price for the goods or services being exchanged is at least equal to the value of what has
been offered in exchange (Crompton, 2004). In other words, both parties in the relationship must
feel assured that the relationship is mutually beneficial and is meeting its stated objectives before
they can make a commitment to extend or expand upon the existing relationship.
McCarville and Copeland (1994) were among the first to apply exchange theory to assist
in understanding the motivations of each side of the sponsorship relationship. The researchers
proposed that the principles of rationality, marginal utility, and fairness are guiding forces in
sponsorship-related decision-making. As noted by Dees (2011), McCarville and Copeland (1994)
explained that a marketing relationship viewed through the lens of exchange theory will only
continue if the sponsoring firm is realizing its stated objectives via the partnership. In applying
their considerable work in RM to help understand exchanges, Palmatier et al. (2006) reasoned
that the duration of a relationship, or the “length of time that the relationship between the
exchange partners has existed,” (p. 138) should be expected to influence the probability that a
firm realizes its objectives from the partnership. Relatedly, Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987)
discussed the concept that these types of relationships are ongoing in nature, and accordingly
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conceptualized a framework for developing and maintaining a relational exchange with its
foundation the levels of commitment and trust exhibited by the parties on both sides of the
relationship. During the early stages of any relationship, when trust is theoretically at its lowest,
both sides of the relationship are provided with the opportunity to understand each other’s
capabilities and objectives (Dorai and Varshney, 2012; Palmatier et al., 2006).
Viewing sponsorship relationships through the lens of exchange theory informs the
perspective that only when both sides are satisfied with the resources provided by each via the
relationship will it continue. Given that both sides in our context have elected to deepen their
relationship via an equity partnership in the formation of a minority equity sponsorship
agreement, this investigation is a useful step towards a more nuanced understanding of the
importance of various types of resources for both sides of the sponsorship relationship. Thus, the
application of exchange theory in this study demonstrates that only once an understanding of the
resources provided by both partners is achieved and trust is established, can a decision be made
by one or both partners to either continue or end the relationship. In the context of this study, the
longer-term relationship, as informed by exchange theory, will be marked by a continued
exchange of resources throughout the duration of the partnership.
Having origins in exchange theory is the RM paradigm, which has been utilized
previously to inform business-to-business (B2B) alliances, and also undergirds this study. RM is
useful in the context of this study in that it offers a theoretical lens in which to view the
relationship between, in the case of this study, a corporate entity (i.e., the sponsoring brand) and
the sponsored organization (i.e., a Bundesliga club). In their seminal work on the applications of
RM in marketing contexts, Morgan and Hunt (1994) explained that RM helps us understand
“marketing activities directed toward establishing, developing, and maintaining successful
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relationship exchanges” (p. 22). In the development of this definition, the authors examined
previous definitions of RM activities, finding that many did not include a customer as one of the
sides of the exchange. In addition, they found that oftentimes prior definitions were not inclusive
of a buyer and seller, but rather simply “partners exchanging resources” (Morgan and Hunt,
1994, p. 22). A few years later, Cornwell and Maignan (1998) were among the first to apply the
RM paradigm to sponsorship relationships, and recommend it as an appropriate lens with which
to view sponsorship. They considered RM an appropriate framework for sponsorship given that
it is essentially an instrument of relationship building, both from a B2B perspective and in the
sponsor’s efforts to build a bond with the end consumer. In addition, throughout the sponsorshiplinked marketing literature, sponsorship has been studied as a strategy in which to engage in both
customer-and industry-focused relationships, across both the community at large and the firm’s
employees (Cornwell et al., 2018; Cornwell and Maignan, 1998).
In terms of placing the relationships analyzed in this study in the most appropriate RM
framework, Morgan and Hunt (1994) analyzed 10 different forms of RM, categorizing each into
four groups identified as supplier, lateral, buyer, or internal partnerships. Based on this
conceptualization, the alliances studied in this research are akin to lateral, or horizontal,
partnerships (e.g., Jensen and Cornwell, 2021). The rationale for such a categorization is that
these relationships are not internal in nature (in terms of focusing on internal departments,
business units, or employees), nor are they considered to be suppliers (such as suppliers of good
or services to the firm). In addition, relationships with an origin in sponsorship are not typically
considered to be a buyer partnership, or focused on purchases of the firm’s products by the other
organization. Thus, the RM paradigm informs the perspective that these relationships are lateral
(or horizontal) strategic alliances characterized by an exchange of resources.
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This perspective is consistent with both exchange theory and RM, and informed various
aspects of this study. For example, the interview guide was undergirded by both perspectives,
and informed the questioning of individuals interviewed for this study (Appendix A). Themes
focusing on the levels of trust and commitment required within the personal relationships among
individuals and across both organizations were probed, based on the theoretical lens of RM. In
another example, efforts were made to identify specific resources that each side of the
relationship were seeking from the other, including discussions of the resources that were already
identified or were expected to be acquired during the term of the alliance. Finally, consistent
with exchange theory, the motivations of each side of the relationship were examined, with each
integrated into the study’s conceptual model (Figure 1). While minority equity sponsorship
agreements may display characteristics similar to traditional sponsorship agreements, given the
relationship characteristics such as trust and commitment as well as the longer duration of the
relationship, these agreements may also display some unique characteristics similar to those of
minority equity alliances. Accordingly, in the following we review the literature on both
traditional sponsorships and on minority equity alliances, compare them along key characteristics
and discuss how differences in these relations informed our study and findings.
1.1.2. Traditional Sponsorship Agreements
Prior literature has conceptualized traditional sponsorships as contract-based marketing
alliances (Farrelly and Quester, 2005; Urriolagoitia and Planellas, 2007) and explored a set of
topics to provide theoretical and empirical insights regarding the impact on both parties involved
(Babiak et al., 2018; Babiak and Willem, 2016). Specifically, previous research has studied a
number of topics, including the behavioral effects of sponsorships (Herrmann et al., 2016),
sponsorship effects on brand image (Nickell et al., 2017) and on shareholder value (Deitz et al.,
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2013). More recently, Cornwell and Kwon (2020) reviewed the sponsorship-linked marketing
literature, focusing on the period from 1996 to 2017. Notably, the work of the researchers
revealed an over-reliance on the consumer effects of sponsorship, at the expense of research
illuminating the management of the entire sponsorship process and studies from the perspective
of corporate decision-makers. Their analysis concluded that the literature is tilted towards
consumer outcomes, ostensibly the end of the sponsorship process. They concluded that one
potential reason for this misalignment of research stems from a failure to consider the whole of
the sponsorship process and a failure to understand the intricacies of the management of
sponsorships from the brand marketer perspective (Cornwell and Kwon, 2020). One possible
exception is a recent stream of research focusing on the decision, from the perspective of the
sponsoring brand, on whether to continue or end sponsorship relationships (e.g., Jensen and
Cornwell, 2017). For example, Dick and Uhrich (2017) utilized an experimental design to
determine whether the type of exit or the consequences of the decision impacted consumer
attitudes, utilizing the context of German football. They found that attitudes were negatively
affected when the sponsor chose to exit the relationship of their own will, particularly when there
were extensive consequences for the property (Dick and Uhrich, 2017).
Jensen and Cornwell (2017) also utilized an international context in their study of why
sponsors choose to renew or end sponsorship relationships. The research found that economic
conditions in the sponsor’s home country and clutter increased the probability of a sponsor
leaving. In contrast, congruence and high levels of brand equity were found to decrease the
probability of a sponsor choosing to exit. Jensen and Cornwell (2021) then utilized a different
context (title sponsorships of U.S.-based events), finding that a sponsor’s regional proximity and
a B2B perspective increased the propensity of renewal. Recently, van Rijn, Kristal, and Henseler
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(2019) examined 24 different cases of sponsors exiting agreements with Netherlands-based
football clubs and completed an in-depth analysis of the prior work of Copeland, Frisby, and
McCarville (2006), Farrelly (2010), and Jensen and Cornwell (2017). After conducting 19 indepth interviews, the research revealed 10 reasons why sponsors exited agreements.
Apart from this recent research emanating from a management-focused perspective,
Cornwell and Kwon (2020) concluded that the literature would benefit from more studies on
management decision-making, and those that examined facets of the sponsorship process
previously ignored by researchers. Given that the current study utilizes the perspective of
management decision-makers, as well as investigates the under-researched phenomenon of
minority equity sponsorship agreements, we feel this research is well-positioned to both respond
to this call and make a meaningful contribution to the sponsorship-linked marketing literature.
1.1.3. Minority Equity Alliances
Strategic alliances exist in a number of forms, for a multitude of motivations, and in a
range of complexities (Gomes, Barnes, and Mahmood, 2016; Kohtamaki, Rabetino, and Moller,
2018). A strategic alliance by definition is “a formal agreement between two or more business
organizations to pursue a set of private and common interests through the sharing of resources in
contexts involving uncertainty over outcomes” (Arino, 2003, p. 67). The literature on strategic
alliances has adopted diverse theoretical, paradigmatic, and methodological approaches to study
a range of topics, including: motivations and partner selection for alliances, alliance negotiations,
management, and outcomes (see Gomes et al., 2016; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011;
Wassmer, 2010). A number of existing studies examine distinctions between the legal/structural
forms of strategic alliances; namely joint ventures, minority equity alliances, and contractualbased alliances (Albers et al., 2016; Das and Teng, 2000; 2001; Piaskowska et al., 2019). Das
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and Teng (2001, p. 17), compare the characteristics of alliance structures and discuss that
minority equity alliances differ from both joint ventures, as well as from other majority equitybased alliances. Specifically, minority equity alliances differ from other equity-based alliances in
that the level of equity investment in minority equity alliances is below 50%. As a result, there is
a relatively limited integration of both entities, which is especially evident in the investor’s
limited control over the investee operations and alignment of interests among parties (Ragozzino
and Reuer, 2009). However, degree is dependent on the scale of equity position and may be onesided (Das and Teng, 1998). Compared to contractual alliances, the equity position in a minority
equity alliance results in an increased commitment of partners (Pangarkar, 2003). For example,
firms that acquire equity often gain one or more board seats on the partner’s board of directors.
However, as shown by Devarakonda and Reuer (2019), the likelihood of a board seat is
correlated with the size of the equity stake. Similar to joint ventures, the equity position results in
a lower likelihood of engaging in opportunistic behavior (Das and Rahman, 2010).
Recent research on minority equity alliances has focused on underexplored governance
mechanisms and outcomes of these relationships. The complexity and interdependency of a
relationship increases when the engagement of partners in the relationship is higher, given the
amount of resources exchanged to maintain the relationship (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Relatively
lower levels of complexity and interdependency in minority equity alliances compared to
majority equity alliances has been shown to positively affect learning opportunities for partners
(Piaskowska et al., 2019). Devarakonda and Reuer (2019) illustrated that the role of a seat on the
board of directors of the investee goes beyond traditionally accepted governance-related
monitoring and control and involves experience sharing and preventing knowledge spillovers.
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While there is prior research comparing equity-based alliances to non-equity based
alliances and fully owned subsidiaries, there is a dearth of research on the differences between
various forms of equity-based alliances (i.e., minority, 50-50, majority) (Piaskowska et al.,
2019). Similarly, there is extensive research on the formation and structure of alliances (e.g.,
payoff structures, contingency planning, task descriptions) but there is limited attention to how
these relationships are executed once formed. For instance, we know little about the implications
for the board of directors and other internal (e.g., administrators and employees in parties
responsible with undertaking the alliance) and external (e.g., customers, other allies, society)
stakeholders of the organization (Devarakonda and Reuer, 2019). Moreover, we know little
about minority equity alliances in different economic contexts between non-traditional
organizations (such as sponsorships of sport organizations or corporate venture capital
investments in startups) and how these may lead to different outcomes for these relationships
(Piaskowska et al., 2019). In the following, we focus on such a unique context, and discuss the
differences between minority equity sponsorship agreements from both traditional sponsorships
and minority equity alliances, which sets the stage for our data collection and analysis.
1.1.4. Minority Equity Sponsorship Agreements
While there has been abundant research on traditional sponsorships as contract-based
relationships (e.g., Cornwell and Kwon, 2020) and on minority equity alliances (e.g., Piaskowska
et al., 2019), we know little about sponsorships that are organized as minority equity agreements.
In particular, there is a dearth of research focusing on the key actors and stakeholders involved
and the motivations, dynamics, and resources exchanged in these relationships for the partners
we focus on in this study. This is important, given that minority equity sponsorship agreements
are distinct from both traditional sponsorship agreements (which are essentially contract-based
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alliances; Farrelly and Quester, 2005; Urriolagoitia and Planellas, 2007) as well as from minority
equity-based alliances. In a traditional sponsorship agreement, no equity is exchanged and
therefore this alliance represents the lowest commitment level between the two parties (Albers et
al., 2016). Due to this, there exists less alignment of interest and subsequently results in
traditional sponsorships being more appropriate for shorter-term strategic relationships where a
building of trust between the two parties is not as necessary (Das and Teng, 1998; 2001). They
also differ from traditional sponsorships based on their ownership structure, degree of
integration, and governance mechanism for the alliance, length, and termination of the
relationship. Similarly, relative to minority equity sponsorship agreements, traditional
sponsorships involve less congruence among the goals of engaged parties, and mutual benefit is
maintained by the contract and/or reciprocity in these relationships (Das and Teng, 2001).
Minority equity sponsorship agreements also differ from minority equity alliances
established in the literature (Albers et al., 2016; Piaskowska et al., 2019). Specifically, these
agreements diverge from minority equity alliances given that sponsored organizations (e.g., sport
clubs) tend to be financially different than traditional businesses, as they do not distribute profits
to shareholders like for-profit businesses, their external stakeholders (e.g., region, media,
supporters) are more involved and important for the organization, and their organizational
structure and governance are distinct from traditional for-profit businesses (da Silva and Casas,
2017; Leeds and Von Allmen, 2016). Similarly, as discussed below, sport sponsorship is a strong
context wherein stakeholder involvement and scrutiny are elevated and key metrics to track
organizational performance go beyond financial performance (McCarville and Copeland, 1994).
Accordingly, in minority equity sponsorship agreements, the sponsoring firm goes
beyond traditional contractual agreements and invests in a sport organization, leading to some
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control over their activities, while at the same time navigating the unique structure of these
organizations and the scrutiny of their external stakeholders. In Table 1, we compare traditional
sponsorships with minority equity alliances based on the financial and organizational structure of
the relationship, alignment of partners’ interests, duration of the relationship, benefits received
by the partners, effects of the relationship on the investee’s board of directors and investors’
monitoring ability of their investment, the role of trust and commitment for initiating and
maintaining the relationship, and potential for partners to engage in opportunistic behavior. This
comparison triggered various questions regarding the motivations, dynamics, and resources
exchanged in minority equity sponsorship agreements (Table 1) which constituted the basis of
our inquiry and informed our interview guide (Appendix A).
-----------------------Insert Table 1 about here
----------------------2.

Methodology
We adopted a qualitative methodology following similar research exploring unique

phenomena related to sport-related marketing (Benjits, Lagae, Vanclooster, 2011). This
methodology allows us to look deeply into a phenomenon based on the insights of various key
actors involved in it by systematically analyzing data collected from these actors to develop a
comprehensive description of the phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In this case, the
actors are employees and executives of firms and football clubs, as well as key stakeholders such
as legal advisors, university professors and sport marketing executives in Germany.
2.1. Context
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The context of our research is the German Bundesliga (Germany’s top tier football league
that consists of 18 clubs) which is one of the top sport leagues in the world in terms of its
reputation, fan support, commercial value, and sponsorship tradition (Buhler, 2006). The German
Bundesliga is listed as the most profitable sports industry in Germany and is a good context for
studying interorganizational relations, as the football clubs are intertwined with each other and
well-known to external stakeholders (Moliterno et al., 2014). There is considerable business
research on football in general and specifically on the German Bundesliga (e.g., Balliauw et al.,
2019; Bartling et al., 2015; Bauer et al., 2005).
Sport organizations increasingly operate as large, multinational, and complex businesses
presenting strategic actions and interactions, similar to their traditional counterparts including
non-equity based or equity-based strategic alliances (Cousens et al., 2006). Firms have been
using sport sponsorship as a marketing channel to drive consumer traffic for decades. These
arrangements consist of the firm paying a specific monetary amount for the rights to use a sport
team’s assets or intellectual property (e.g., logo, signage, tickets, suites, etc.). However, Bayern
Munich recently initiated a new form of sponsorship agreement with the purpose of generating
revenue to become more globally competitive, wherein firms also take equity positions in the
football clubs they sponsor. This practice was quickly adopted by other competitive clubs in the
Bundesliga but not yet prevalent for others (Reuters, 2014). While clubs including Bayern
Munich, Borussia Dortmund, Eintracht Frankfurt, and Hertha BSC have one or more minority
equity sponsors, other clubs such as Fortuna Dusseldorf, FSV Mainz, and FC Union Berlin do
not have any partners (see KPMG, 2020 for a full list of 14 minority equity partners in six clubs
in the Bundesliga). Clubs that pursue minority equity sponsorship agreements no longer organize
as a “registered association” (which was the predominant organizational form in the Bundesliga
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prior to these agreements) but as a “limited partnership” or a “limited liability company” wherein
the club sets aside minority shares to be acquired by limited partners in perpetuity guided by its
board of directors without any reference to potential divestiture of minority equity in the future.
As an example, German automobile manufacturer Audi announced that they would invest 90
million euros in Bayern Munich, in exchange for around a 9% perpetual equity stake
(fcbayern.com, 2009). We posit that this practice changes the firm/club relationship from a
marketing channel to a minority equity sponsorship agreement. In the Bundesliga, the practice of
minority equity sponsorship agreements is particularly salient, given its 50+1 rule that limits
commercial investments to 49 percent and assures the clubs have control over their operations
(Bundesliga, 2018). Moreover, historically, German football clubs are known to engage in
multiple long-term, high profile relationships with major sponsoring firms (Thomas and
Roeseler, 2013) providing an opportunity to explore the nature of these relations. While the
majority of these sponsorship agreements lay the foundation for long-term relationships, they are
not always successfully maintained due to disputes over “calling the shots” in the club, inability
to deliver results, or dissatisfaction of stakeholders (Honigstein, 2018; Reuters, 2015).
2.2. Data Overview
Our main source of data involved conducting 24 semi-structured interviews with key
stakeholders. Following prior research (Kumar et al., 1993), we adopted a purposeful sampling
approach focusing on key informants with relevant insights on our phenomenon of interest.
Specifically, we identified representatives of major football clubs, marketing managers in
sponsoring firms, and key researchers at local universities, reaching out to them via email and
conducting the initial interviews. Using these initial interviews as a starting point, we utilized
snowball sampling (Lincoln and Guba, 1995; Rahman et al., 2020), through which we gained
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access to more interviewees. Among the initial interviewees, a high level executive in a major
football club as well as a researcher who also worked as a consultant to various clubs helped us
gain access to many subsequent interviewees. This iterative process resulted in a sample which
continued to evolve until we achieved “theoretical saturation” or the point at which additional
interviews did not offer any new insights (Gioia et al., 2013).
We interviewed representatives from various firms and football clubs (Table 2). Given
that these minority equity sponsorship agreements impact key stakeholders such as third party
organizations (i.e., law firms, advertising agencies, consultants, universities, club supporters), we
also interviewed representatives from these stakeholder groups. Specifically, participants
included six current or former firm employees or executives that purchased equity shares, six
Bundesliga football club employees or executives, and 10 key stakeholders including a stadium
employee, an advertising agency employee for a participating firm, a sport attorney well-versed
in these strategic alliance negotiations between firms and clubs, researchers in the marketing and
management disciplines at local universities, a sport marketing consultant, and official club
support organizers for two different clubs. Our final sample includes representatives from seven
different football clubs and six different corporate sponsors.
-----------------------Insert Table 2 about here
----------------------All interviews were scheduled through email and were conducted face-to-face or over the
phone between July of 2015 and September of 2017 at various locations in Germany (club
headquarters, corporate offices, local universities, on the phone, and a café). The length of
interviews ranged from 37 to 150 minutes, averaging around an hour, and all interviews were
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recorded and transcribed verbatim by a professional. Prior to beginning data collection, we
prepared an interview guide (Appendix A), which was revised through two pilot interviews.
Triangulation, or using multiple sources of data, is critical for qualitative research
because inferences from the data are corroborated by several sources helping to ensure construct
validity (Yin, 2009). To triangulate our findings, following similar research (Benjits et al., 2011),
we collected data through participant observation (site visits in Germany on three different
occasions, including stadium visits, factory tours, and attending games), as well as secondary
data such as annual financial statements of participating firms and Bundesliga clubs, annual
reports published by the Bundesliga, newspaper and magazine articles that dealt with these
minority equity sponsorship agreements published in German newspaper’s Handelsblatt (20092017) and Deutsche Welle (2010-2017), sport business industry newsletter Pro-Sports Media (all
articles), and four books closely related to our phenomenon of interest (Ewing, 2017; Garcia and
Zheng, 2017; Rudolph, 2002; Szymanski, 2015). We also searched the Lexis Nexis database for
keywords, including: equity, sponsor, and Bundesliga after 2010 and reviewed and utilized the
177 unique articles published in various media outlets in English in our analysis.
2.3. Data Analysis
Following Strauss and Corbin (1998) and Gioia et al (2013), we pursued a three-stage
process for data analysis to develop a detailed story regarding the minority equity sponsorship
agreements in the context of German Bundesliga. We iteratively moved between our interview
data, analytical memos, and relevant existing research to generate themes and dimensions
underlying this phenomenon (Gioia et al., 2013). We utilized the constant-comparison method in
which we compared data within each interview, between interviews, and within and between
codes (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Throughout our analysis, we used the Nvivo 11 qualitative
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analysis software which helped to organize our data, develop theoretical links among codes, and
analyze the data horizontally (within interview) and vertically (within code).
All the data was coded by a single author. Throughout the data analysis, the authors
shared the evolving data structure and iterated numerous times through the composition of the
data structure. Two authors, including one not involved in the data collection process, engaged in
peer debriefing by continuously sharing the interpretations of each interview as well as the
emerging code structure. In the first stage of data analysis, we began by reviewing a group of
interviews to familiarize ourselves with the content and explore recurring themes across
interviews and continued with a detailed ‘micro-analysis’ to develop first-order categories
inferred from interviews and labeled with brief descriptive concepts (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
In the second stage, we worked on restructuring the interview data by relating first-order
categories to abstract second-order themes that are utilized as the building blocks of the
emerging theory based on their content, dimensions, and attributes (Gioia et al., 2013). In the
final stage of data analysis, we focused on developing a theoretical story line building on the
second-order themes by analyzing the relationships between them and grouping them under
aggregate dimensions that underlie the emerging theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
Accordingly, we focused on developing a detailed theory of motivations, dynamics, and
consequences of the relationships between firms and German football clubs. Table 3 illustrates
an overview of our data structure, including the first-order categories, second-order themes, and
aggregate dimensions (Gioia et al., 2013) organized separately for investing firms and clubs.
Throughout data analysis, the authors shared and continuously updated the evolving data
structure (Table 3). Another, more detailed data analysis document was created to summarize
each first-order category, their content, and representative quotes, as well as their role and
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importance for the emerging theory, which was continuously updated. We compared our findings
to the literature on sponsorships and equity alliances. In both data collection and analysis, we
carefully followed the criteria for rigor in qualitative research (Shah and Corley, 2006).
-----------------------Insert Table 3 about here
----------------------4. Findings
In this section, we discuss the findings related to the phenomenon of for-profit firms
(“firms” or “sponsors” from here on) – in many cases publicly traded – purchasing minority
equity shares in Bundesliga football clubs (“clubs” or “investees” from here on). Our findings
revealed major themes regarding the rational and emotional motivations, dynamics and
interorganizational relationship characteristics for minority equity sponsorship agreements as
well as resources exchanged and stakeholder reactions to these relationships (Table 3). In line
with exchange theory (McCarville and Copeland, 1994) and RM research (Cornwell and
Maignan, 1998), we not only focus on a single side of the relationship but adopt a dual
perspective and study the point of views of both sponsors and clubs. Moreover, consistent with
the premises of RM literature (Cornwell et al., 2018), we also integrate the role of other
stakeholders such as firm customers, club supporters, employees, regional leaders, and media in
the discussion of our findings. We provide further supportive evidence for each theme from the
perspective of firms in Table 4 and clubs in Table 5, respectively.
-----------------------Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here
-----------------------
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4.1. Motivations for Engaging in Minority Equity Sponsorship Agreements
Exchange theory suggests that both parties involved in a relationship should perceive
value in engaging in the relationship (Dees, 2011). Accordingly, the motivations to engage in
interorganizational relationships may involve rational motivations such as marginal utility and
access to specific resources as well as emotional motivations such as fairness and balance of
power (McCarville and Copeland, 1994). In line with this perspective, we also identified firms’
and clubs’ rational and emotional motivations in engaging in minority equity sponsorship
agreements (Table 3). Firms and clubs have complementary but unique reasons for deciding to
engage in these sponsorship agreements (Tables 4 and 5). For firms, these may involve rational
motivations such as tracking long-term impact of investments, gaining control over how the
investment is used by clubs, and attracting and retaining better employees. Firms are also
emotionally motivated as they seek to strengthen their impact in the region in which they are
headquartered, achieve stakeholder satisfaction in the region, and advance interpersonal
connections with regional leaders via these minority equity sponsorship agreements. For clubs,
the rational motivation for engaging in these relationships is to secure financial resources for
long-and-short-term investments to ensure the club’s long-term survival and short-term success.
Clubs are also emotionally motivated to engage in these agreements as they seek to serve as a
connector for various stakeholders in a region to create a supportive community around the club.
4.1.1. Rational Motivations for Firms and Clubs
Our first theme deals with the rational motivations of firms and clubs for engaging in
minority equity sponsorship agreements. According to our interviewees, firms want their equity
investments to be spent on more long-term investments. Specifically, in these minority equity
sponsorship agreements, firms mostly do not have control over the day-to-day operations of

23
these clubs and they are not interested in short-term outcomes that might be better achieved, for
example, by acquiring a potential highly marketable player in the transfer window. Rather, they
are interested in long-term outcomes, such as investments in a youth academy system that will
produce results in the longer term (e.g, Interviewees 16 and 24). Accordingly, by engaging in
minority equity sponsorship agreements, firms can direct clubs towards investments such as
updating the club’s youth academies and stadium upgrades, which tend to increase the long-term
value of the club by establishing or reinforcing a solid foundation for the future as noted by a
news article regarding the investment by Allianz in Bayern Munich:
“German insurer Allianz in February took an 8.33 percent stake in Bayern Munich for
110 million euros as part of a deal to help the club pay down debts on its stadium and to
sponsor a youth academy.” (Reuters, 2014: paragraph 8).
As noted by the relationship marketing perspective, the length of relationship is a
function of congruence between party’s objectives (Palmatier et al. 2006). In our case, the longterm orientation of firms is matched by clubs which try to navigate the conflict between these
requests from investors and short-term expectations from club supporters and other stakeholders.
Specifically, clubs are under constant pressure from supporters and the media to spend money on
top players on the transfer market in hopes of providing immediate results for the club, which is
an obvious conflicting interest between firms and clubs in a sponsorship agreement. While this
philosophy potentially carries a higher chance of immediate success for the club, there is a larger
downside concerned with putting the club in financial constraints with long-term contractual
obligations for specific players. Specifically, in German football, clubs compete within their
domestic league (Bundesliga) and also compete with other European clubs for both talent and
supporters, as well as in large tournaments including the Champions League. For example, the
rules of promotion and relegation (i.e., clubs that finish in the bottom each season get demoted
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and the ones at the top get promoted) in the league creates pressure for clubs resulting with a
continuous search for external financial resources. As such, it seems only natural that firms
would want tighter control over their investments in the club by acquiring equity and associated
control over the clubs’ strategic decisions, as illustrated by a club employee below:
The seat on the board is to protect their investment and make sure the football side
doesn’t spend it unwisely. (…) (Interviewee #2)
Based on our findings, another rational motivation for building minority equity
sponsorship agreements with regional clubs is to strengthen the firm’s employee recruitment and
retention, using a club’s assets. Specifically, firms engage in agreements with clubs as a means
for providing and supporting entertainment for their employees who live in that town. We posit
this as a relationship marketing tool, using job embeddedness to increase human capital and thus
firm value (Balliauw et al., 2019; Holtom et al., 2006). According to interviewees (e.g.,
Interviewees 18 and 21) and archival data (Burmaster, 2019), some of the minority equity
sponsorship agreements are used as an employee management and recruitment tool. A professor
who consults with Bundesliga clubs notes:
In the case of Ingolstadt and Wolfsburg, those are small towns without a lot to do. In
order for those companies to recruit workers and their families they have to provide a
reason other than work for people to live in that city. So they invest in sponsoring those
clubs (…) to influence the labor market. (Interviewee #21)
Regarding rational motivations for clubs to engage in minority equity sponsorship
agreements, a reason for clubs to pursue these relationships also involves mimicking the success
recipes of other successful clubs. With the exception of Bayer Leverkusen and Wolfsburg, whose
agreements with Bayer and Volkswagen started in the early 1900’s, the recent equity
relationships started with Bayern Munich, the most successful club in Germany and a top club in
both Europe and the rest of the world. As such, other clubs copied their strategy (e.g.,
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“Dortmund may be taking a page from rival Bayern's playbook in seeking more corporate
backing.” (Reuters, 2014) as there seems to be a ‘follow-the-leader’ philosophy, as noted by
Deutsche Welle (2014) and confirmed by a club executive:
Reigning German champions Bayern Munich serve as a role model in these endeavours.
(…) Long ago it changed its status, becoming a public holding company. Sportsgear
manufacturer Adidas, insurance giant Allianz and premium carmaker Audi now hold a
combined stake of 24.9 percent in the club. Allianz alone paid 110 million euros to
purchase the 8.3-percent stake it owns. (Deutsche Welle, 2014)
With football, you always mimic the stronger teams. On and off the pitch. (…)Here,
everyone follows Bayern Munich. They were the first club to enter into these equity deals
(…). Then Borussia Dortmund. Stuttgart was the latest. We are all looking to raise new
revenue without raising ticket prices. (Interviewee #21)
4.1.2. Emotional Motivations for Firms and Clubs
Our next theme represents emotional motivations for both firms and clubs to engage in
minority equity sponsorship agreements. Many of our interviewees noted that decisions related
to these agreements are often made not based on bottom-line profit motives, but on personal
relationships (e.g., Interviewee 8, 11, 18, and 23). Therefore, we classified these motivations as
emotional (as opposed to rational) motivations. Like any other social interaction, minority equity
sponsorship agreements take place through close ties between the executives of firms and clubs
and are affected by external stakeholders such as regional political leaders or club supporters.
From a managerial perspective, firms utilize these agreements to further their relations with
stakeholders in a region where they are headquartered or have major production facilities.
While regional proximity between firms and clubs precedes these agreements, our
findings show that this geographic proximity and maintaining and nourishing the ecosystem that
it creates serves as an important motivation for minority equity sponsorship agreements. For
example, Audi has a manufacturing plant in Ingolstadt. Their investments not only help to build
social goodwill with supporters of the club, townspeople, and area political leaders but also a
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long-term partnership between the club, sponsor, and local stakeholders for the betterment of
everyone. German firms – and equity investors in Dortmund – Evonik and Signal Iduna are
based in/around the city. Athletic apparel firm Puma is a German firm with a large history
supporting national sport interest. Allianz, Audi, and Adidas are all based in/around Munich.
Large multinational firms Bayer and VW are headquartered in industrial cities where the club’s
Bayer Leverkusen and Wolfsburg reside. Deutsche Welle (2014) noted in an article exploring
these minority equity sponsorships that relations between firms headquartered in a region and
local clubs often begin as a traditional sponsorship and progress to an equity-based agreement:
German auto maker Daimler is set to participate in the share issue, scheduled to become
the club’s [Stuttgart] largest shareholder. Situated in the Stuttgart region, the carmaker
already holds the rights to the name of the club’s stadium which is called “Gottlieb
Daimler Arena.” (Deutsche Welle, 2014)
Another finding with implications for both firms and clubs was that both engaged in
minority equity sponsorship agreements as a way to placate specific stakeholder groups.
Numerous interviewees noted the different stakeholder groups that were involved in a
Bundesliga club. Similar to other sports, Bundesliga clubs enjoy the following of many distinct
stakeholder groups including club supporters, sponsors, business leaders, local and regional
firms, area politicians, media firms, and firm employees. A former sport marketing executive
who has worked with numerous German sport clubs notes:
The one common denominator in all of [minority equity sponsorship agreements] is
trying to make some constituency of the company happy. With the Volkswagen investment
in Wolfsburg it is done to make the town a more pleasant place to live so Volkswagen can
recruit top engineers to the town. With Audi, Adidas, and Allianz and Bayern Munich it is
because the companies want to associate with a global football club. (Interviewee #8)
In just one example of the political ties among stakeholders, Lower Saxony, the German
state where Volkswagen and VfL Wolfsburg are located, owns 59 million shares of the
automotive manufacturer’s stock (Reuters, 2017). This stock is valued at 7.6 billion euros and
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gives the municipality influence in the firm’s business practices. Moreover, numerous
supervisory board members of the club have held positions with the surrounding city and state
municipality governments. The club’s supervisory committee also includes executives from the
firm (Murphy, 2017). A club executive points to these strong ties:
In Germany, there is a lot of political involvement in football. The CEO’s, politicians,
and club leaders are all friends. Tightly connected. Ingolstadt is a perfect example.
Historically, they were a lower level club. But Audi - the main employer in town - worked
with the city’s politicians and club leaders to build the club a new stadium and help it
improve. They now play in the first division. Having a successful football club is seen as
a win for the company’s executives, company employees, club leadership, politicians, and
city residents. Audi gets credit for driving this success. (Interviewee #23)
Relatedly, a final motivation for minority equity sponsorship agreements for both firms
and clubs involves personal interactions and relationships between key actors of these firms and
clubs, as well as with key political figures. It was obvious from the interviewees that personal
relationships played a large role in these arrangements. A club consultant states another strong
bond was between corporate executives from area firms and club leadership:
(…) these are decisions that are made on the basis of community integration. Marketing
and social benefits if you will. You have to understand that there is tremendous
community overlap between these companies and the football clubs. I mean political and
social. They know each other. The CEO’s and the club leadership. I guess you could look
at these as “soft investments.” (Interviewee #18)
4.2.

Dynamics of Establishing and Maintaining Minority Equity Sponsorship Agreements
Establishing and maintaining successful exchanges requires accommodations by engaged

parties to ensure mutual benefit for them (Chang et al., 2015; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005;
McCarville and Copeland, 1994). Building on and extending these findings, we illustrate that
developing mutually beneficial minority equity alliances in our study’s context requires both
firms and clubs to have an insightful understanding of the institutional context and requirements,
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to commit to the relationship in the long-run by establishing trust and reputation, and often
involves going through structural changes to accommodate the partnership (Table 3).
The RM paradigm suggests that the duration of the relationship is a function of
interpersonal interactions in the sponsorship agreement (Cornwell et al., 2018). These
interpersonal interactions are guided by the main pillars of exchange theory, including trust and
reciprocity (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). However, even in long-term and equity-based
relationships, opportunistic behavior is an unavoidable dynamic of interfirm cooperation (Das
and Teng, 1998). Accordingly, in the following, we share our findings related to the dynamics
that sets the stage for long-term minority equity sponsorship agreements especially focusing on
the roles of commitment, trust, and reputation and highlighting some instances of opportunistic
behavior in these relationships. We provide additional evidence from our data in Tables 4 and 5.
4.2.1. Managing Institutional Pressures and Committing to the Agreement
The institutional environment for minority equity sponsorship agreements in the
Bundesliga is heavily regulated and is under constant public scrutiny (Moliterno et al., 2014).
Historically, clubs have been designated as “member associations” (Dietl and Franck, 2007).
Numerous interviewees noted that this is a legal classification in Germany which gives clubs forprofit status. However, by law, any profits must be reinvested in the clubs. This member
association designation is important to supporters of the clubs, who view themselves as part of
the organization’s decision-making process. By selling an equity stake to firms, the clubs are
forced to change their legal status from member associations to what is referred to in Germany as
an AG organization (joint stock company). An attorney who negotiated numerous deals notes:
So there was a lot of pressure let’s say from the legal side to think about [if] the
[registered] association is the right path of vehicle in which you can run a football club.
The federation, the German Football Association, was heavily against any kind of change
in that. (…) But then the pressure becomes higher and higher and the risk became higher
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and higher. The risk meaning that let’s say if some association went bankrupt all of the
members of the association would be held liable for that. (Interviewee #15)
Owing to tradition, the German Football Federation (governing body of German football)
is uncomfortable with the restructuring process. In an effort to control the pace of change, the
German authorities implemented a 50 + 1 rule. Basically, the club had to own at least 51%,
which in turn means that only 49% of the club can be owned by an outside interest (Bundesliga,
2018). This is critical, given that the majority owner has the final say in the major decisions of
the club, which limits the minority partner’s influence regarding the kind of actions they might
prefer and request from the club. One interviewee noted:
(…) you have different legal entities, you have ‘eingetragener Verein’ which is a limited
[partnership], you have ‘aktiengesellschaft’ which [is] a publicly-traded company (…),
and then you even have clubs whose goal is not to make money; the primary goal is to
serve the society and the secondary goal, they can make profit in order to fill the primary
goal, (…) so it’s really diverse in terms of the legal forms, but [what is] common is that
the club itself still has to have the majority in terms of decision making. (Interviewee #12)
According to our interviewees, these changes were instituted because of the increasing
nature of commerce in the Bundesliga, as well as other top football leagues. This changing
landscape included much larger television/internet rights deals. This creates a chain reaction with
revenue from these agreements flowing to the top clubs, which in turn allows those clubs to
purchase the best talent, ultimately creating a winner-take-all market, as explained in a 2014
interview with various club representatives published in Deutsche Welle:
In 2007, Stuttgart won the German football championship. It was the last time a club
registered as an association under German law achieved this feat, Stuttgart President
Bernd Wahler noted (…) "The probability of a registered football association winning a
national championship again is very low," (…). As Stuttgart finished last season in the
lower half of the table, they are now seeking to turn their fortunes around with the help of
wealthy investors. Hamburg-based football club HSV is set to follow in Stuttgart's
footsteps, and Hertha Berlin in the German capital has already taken a foreign investor
(…) (Deutsche Welle, 2014)
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In light of these institutional as well as resource and competition-based pressures,
minority equity sponsorship agreements are established in a way to account for the challenges
discussed above. A high-level manager for a major football club that we interviewed outlines the
dynamics and structural details of a recent minority equity sponsorship agreement in the
following quote. This interviewee also clearly differentiates this agreement from traditional
sponsorships and explains the commitment required from both parties:
It was a three-step process. First, Daimler paid 41.5 M for 11.75[%] shares of the new
entity. They are our “anchor investor.” They also get a seat on the board. It is important
to understand that these deals are separate from sponsorships. (…) In our case, it came
with a commitment to increase the sponsorship amount as well. (…) these companies give
money two ways. The ownership stake and another is the sponsorship. These investments
give them an element of control. The last part was an agreement to a lower amount of
money if the club stayed in the lower league. Realize, this sends a powerful message to
supporters that Daimler has confidence in us. It will also allow us to raise additional
money from other investors. (Interviewee #10)
4.2.2. Building Long-term Sponsorship Agreements through Reputation and Trust
Given that both firms and clubs have elected to deepen their relationship via an equity
partnership in a minority equity sponsorship agreement, both parties are expected to be
committed to a long-term relationship underlined by reputation and trust. There exists a
reputational separation - both financial and status - between clubs within the Bundesliga. The
clubs that consistently qualify for the UEFA Champions League attract the most media attention
and supporters. Thus, top brands want to associate with them. The clubs that have attracted the
most attention regarding equity investments are Bayern Munich and Borussia Dortmund. Bayern
Munich is one of the top football clubs in the world and truly the only internationally known club
in Bundesliga, although Borussia Dortmund has been competitive in the Champions League for
the last decade. After these two clubs, there is a group of clubs which have what could be termed
“national” reputations. Below those are clubs with a smaller local reputation. Accordingly, firms
seek to use minority equity sponsorship agreements to tap into Bayern Munich’s reputation as
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one of the top football clubs in the world. Industrial firms like Audi, Volkswagen, and Bayer, on
the other hand, invest in other clubs because of workplace benefits, as detailed by a consultant:
Depends on what type of company you are and what your target audience is. The
sponsorship platform has to match the marketing goals of the company. Bayern is a
global football club. Audi, Adidas and Allianz partner with them to gain a global
audience. That is a different marketing goal than Bayer and Volkswagen have for their
investments in Bayer Leverkusen and Wolfsburg. (Interviewee #18)
Accordingly, targeting long-term sponsorship agreements with global clubs is considered
as an initial step towards globalization for firms that are aspiring to be global. However, equity
investment could potentially serve as a stepping stone for the club to become a global competitor
and give the firm global reach as well as regional support as noted by a club employee:
Stuttgart is trying to get Mercedes to partner. They [Mercedes] are based in Stuttgart.
(…) They are interested because they are based in the city, but they are a global brand.
Then again, Stuttgart is not a global football team. (…) Maybe that changes with the
investment. They have historical legacy in German football as one of the top clubs. So
maybe the investment can get them over the top. (Interviewee #2)
For firms with regional emphasis, the priority is to associate with regional clubs that
earned the trust of stakeholders in the region. In doing so, the firm can also join the circle of trust
established in the region among stakeholders and may be considered as part of the ecosystem.
This, in turn, contributes to the firm’s reputation in the eyes of its customer as well as other
regional stakeholders such as the local government, media, and club supporters. These regional
considerations are largely the result of interpersonal interactions, reputation, and trust between
key actors in each organization and lead to longer relationships as noted by an interviewee:
(…) if it’s a regional alliance that is the people in the company have a personal interest
to be affiliated to the club. I know from the Mainz club here for example that the son of
the owner of Erdal which is a big company for shoe polishing and cleaning is one of the
very old and biggest brands. (…) And he just wanted to be part of the club and wanted to
have this VIP area and decided, “Okay, I become the main sponsor of the club.” And
then there was a 15, 20-year-long alliance. (Interviewee #12)
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For clubs, prior interactions and reputation of a potential sponsor serve as indicators of
firm involvement in the relationship, once a minority equity sponsorship agreement is
established. Accordingly, clubs attempt to seek firms that will only be involved in high-level
strategic issues of the club as opposed to its daily operations (e.g., Interviewees 2, 3, 11, and 12).
Moreover, clubs need to trust that the regional influence of a potential sponsor will be received
well by their key stakeholders including club supporters. Supporters, on the other hand, trust and
prefer regional sponsors with history and investments in the region, as opposed to outsiders that
only consider the agreement as a marketing outlet. These delicate relationships woven on trust,
reputation, and commitment are illustrated by a club supporter and organizer:
We have had a longstanding relationship with Daimler. The company has been a sponsor
for years. (…) Volkswagen owns Wolfsburg, Audi has investments in Ingolstadt and
Bayern. So it makes sense for the area’s biggest employer to make an investment in the
region’s top club. In many of these arrangements fans don’t like corporate investment in
the clubs. (…) but most supporters were comfortable with Daimler. (…) They have offices
right across the street from the club’s stadium. (Interviewee #24)
4.2.3. Acting Opportunistically for Firm or Club Benefit
Dynamics between firms and clubs in a minority equity sponsorship agreement are not
always constructive and complementary but at times more complex, due to opportunistic
behavior presented by either party in the relationship. Given the increased involvement of
sponsors in the club in a minority equity sponsorship agreement, the major source of
opportunistic behavior for firms is due to their equity investments in multiple clubs creating a
conflict of interests (Reuters, 2014). The German Football Federation has no rules regarding
potential conflict of interests (e.g., Volkswagen fully owns one club and has partial ownership in
two others) in these agreements because the media acts as a watchdog against inappropriate
behavior from the firms. Similarly, club stakeholders point to the fact that some firms capture too
much influence and control over the club despite regulations including, for example, blocking

33
other potential sponsors to invest in the club which could generate additional resources for the
club to achieve success. A club employee lists various instances of opportunistic behavior:
No doubt Adidas’s relationship with Bayern was to shut out Nike. At the time, Nike was
looking to invest heavily in Germany football. Puma invests in Borussia in large part to
keep Adidas from gaining sponsorship of the second biggest German club. VW’s
executives have publically stated many times the company’s investment in Wolfsburg is
because to remain competitive with other German car companies (…). (Interviewee #23)
Due to institutional and competitive pressures noted above, there is a vicious cycle
wherein the most successful clubs attract the major investors which in turn gives them more
resources to be even more successful in Bundesliga and international competitions. Accordingly,
clubs also tend to engage in opportunistic behaviors especially by crossing the fine line of being
a member association and taking the form of a public holding company to attract multiple
resourceful investors due to the value coming from these sponsorship agreements (Reuters,
2014). Especially internationally well-known clubs such as Bayern Munich and Borussia
Dortmund, as well as followers like Stuttgart, HSV, and Hertha Berlin, engage in constant
restructuring to accommodate multiple investors in their clubs (Deutsche Welle, 2014).
Specifically, these clubs allow the football operations to split off from the rest of the operations
(e.g., other sports, youth academies, stadium operations) of the club. In effect, the football
operations of the club becomes a separate entity, although still majority controlled by the club. It
also allows for a separate supervisory board to oversee the football operations of the club. The
club supporters do not have a seat on the supervisory board. This allows seats for greater athletic
expertise on the board and helps clubs to capitalize on the commerce aspect of football:
(…) we restructured our whole organization (…..) because the sponsors are looking to
communicate with our fans, or the consumer in the stadium, but they are also looking to
get business contacts. (…) The main sponsor, Mercedes-Benz Bank, obviously does both,
(…) To be honest, it’s really difficult to say a sponsorship has this or that value, but we
are working together [research firm], which is a big company doing research and they
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are checking all the data (…)and we are going to our partners let’s see what kind of data
you reached. (Interviewee #10)
4.3.

Exchanged Resources and Stakeholder Reactions
We also explored the resources exchanged by firms and clubs in minority equity

sponsorship agreements in our study’s context (Table 3). For firms, the resources received in the
exchange of resources may involve rational resources with direct impact to firm outcomes, such
as a marketing advantage by being associated with a major club and the ability to limit
competitors’ marketing options. Similarly, the received resources by firms may be more
emotional and intangible in nature with indirect implications for the firms’ bottom line, such as
networking and associating the brand with a popular sport and healthy lifestyle. However, our
findings also suggest that minority equity sponsorship agreements that are especially affected by
opportunistic behaviors from firms may lead to negative stakeholder reactions towards the
sponsor, such as perceptions of foul play when a firm is an investor in multiple clubs as well as
customer dissatisfaction (Table 4).
For clubs, these agreements can lead to rational resources such as much-needed
investments in club infrastructure, access to top talent, and increased professionalism in
managerial ranks due to interactions with, and added control from, professional corporations, as
well as emotional resources such as networking opportunities with the corporate world.
However, given the long-term nature of minority equity sponsorship agreements, it may be
harder for clubs to switch sponsors, particularly when compared to traditional sponsorships,
leading to potential opportunity costs in the long run. Similarly, minority equity sponsorship
agreements may lead to discomfort among stakeholders of the club due to corporate (at times
interlocking) ownership and perceived influence (Table 5).
4.3.1. Rational Resources Exchanged by Firms and Clubs with Direct Benefits
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Minority equity sponsorship agreements can be leveraged to gain a competitive
advantage within a highly competitive industry. One of those industries in Germany is
automobile manufacturing. The country is famous for the slogan “German engineering” and the
competition between German-based firms Volkswagen (Audi), Daimler (Mercedes-Benz) and
BMW is intense. A club executive notes how a minority equity sponsorship agreement built as a
long-term relationship between a firm and a club yields important value for both parties:
One of Audi’s top competitors is BMW. BMW is synonymous with the Bavarian region,
where Munich is located. (…) Audi becomes a sponsor of Bayern Munich the most
popular football club in Bavaria and all of Germany. (…) Audi can leverage the Bayern
brand to increase sales all over the world. The relationship with the club becomes a very
valuable asset that BMW doesn’t have and can’t easily replicate. (Interviewee #23)
Relatedly, another rational resource received by the club is the ability to effectively block
rival firms from valuable advertising resources. Interviewees discussed the ability of one firm to
strategically align itself with a club which, in turn, effectively blocks their rival firm from
establishing a relationship (Interviewees 2, 11, 23). Since Bundesliga clubs are highly visible,
exclusive sponsorship of a club is considered a valuable asset.
A major rational resource received by clubs from these minority equity sponsorship
agreements is a new level of professionalism gained by clubs. Historically, clubs have been run
as “mom and pop” organizations with little bottom line profit motive. Recently - owing to the
influx of large media contracts – this has changed (Die Welt, 2020). Now there is a need and
desire to bring long-term strategic business decision-making to clubs. The majority of firms that
have purchased equity shares are large multinational corporations with experienced managers.
These corporations gain seats on the club’s board of directors which brings both a heightened
level of managerial experience and oversight to the club as illustrated by a club supporter:
I also think they [minority equity sponsorship agreements] can help operate the club in a
more professional manner. I saw that happen here at Hoffenheim. When {the founder of a
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major company} bought the club he installed professionals. Everything changed from
before. It was a sleepy little club, now it is professional in every sense. (…) The club is
ran more like a business and less like a sport club. (Interviewee #22)
Relative to traditional sponsorships, firm executives have more control over how their
investments are spent which they would like to direct to areas that would benefit the long-term
future of the club. As such, they push clubs to direct investments in infrastructure for providing a
long-term structural foundation for the club, a sentiment also shared by other stakeholders (e.g.,
German football federation, regional leaders) in the Bundesliga. In the late 1990’s and early
2000’s, after poor performances in international tournaments, the German football federation
mandated clubs to focus on youth development and infrastructure as part of a strategic initiative
to develop homegrown players. Interviewees noted that Bundesliga clubs have used their equity
investments to strengthen the infrastructure of the club, specifically their youth academies. This
strategy allows for clubs to develop homegrown talent and lessens the need to compete with
other European clubs for top talent during the transfer window. A club employee explains:
(….) However, there was a lack of German talent in the Bundesliga. The DFL put rules
in place regarding the academies. If you wanted a license (to own and operate a club)
you had to invest in a youth academy. It was a way to foster young German players for
both the Bundesliga and the national team. I will say that some of the money from the
investments have been used to bolster the academies. (Interviewee#16)
4.3.2. Emotional Resources Exchanged by Firms and Clubs with Indirect Benefits
Firms utilize club facilities and amenities to build and maintain relationships with other
club stakeholders, which facilitates business. As such, firm executives and politicians use the
football matches as opportunities to network. Similarly, networking at the games and training
facilities between firms plays a large role in developing business relationships. One of the club
goals in these relationships is to utilize the equity partner’s business contacts to possibly reach
out to additional firms that might be interested in spending advertising dollars with the club.
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Similarly, a minority equity sponsorship agreement with a club also provides the executives of
the investor a higher status that can be translated into interactions with the stakeholders of the
club including politicians, media, and club supporters as noted by a club consultant:
I will say that in Europe, football involves politicians in a very social atmosphere. It is
our main social institution in our country and because of that everyone wants to be
involved. It is very social for the CEO’s of these companies to be seen in the boxes at the
stadium. That to me had a lot to do with these alliances. The companies get access to the
club and that is important for both commercial and personal reasons. (Interviewee #20)
Another emotional resource gained is increased stakeholder satisfaction because these
stakeholders acknowledge the importance of equity investments for both long-term sustainability
and short-term competitiveness and success of the club. Specifically, club stakeholders noted that
the two most successful Bundesliga clubs (Bayern Munich and Borussia Dortmund) had moved
to a different model largely involving minority equity sponsorship agreements. Accordingly, it
was clear to some stakeholders that success was dependent on changing the club structure, as
they understood the benefits these agreements brought to a club.
.(…) supporters also realize that to be competitive your club might have to move to a
corporate model. So the competitive side wants the investment and the traditional side
doesn’t always welcome it. (Interviewee #18)
Moreover, increased stakeholder satisfaction is also a function of investments to youth
academies that we discussed above. These academies serve as training grounds for Bundesliga
clubs. Typically, each club sponsors youth teams, with the goal of advancing the best players up
through the system. Good academies create value for the clubs in two ways. One, if a player
advances through a club’s academy, that club owns the player’s rights for a specific time period.
If a club can use its academy to supply players, the clubs do not have to purchase players from
other clubs. However, this practice can be both unpredictable and expensive. Two, if a club can
develop players they can also sell them to other clubs for a profit. A club supporter explains:
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If clubs want to be successful they must have a good youth training program. We call
them academies. These cost money. Coaches, trainers, scouts. Really, only one
Bundesliga club can buy top talent from other clubs – Bayern Munich. At Bayern, part of
Audi and Allianz’s money went to rebuilding their academy. Although Bayern has a good
academy as well. (…)The rest of us have to home grown players. (Interviewee #21)
4.3.3. Negative Stakeholder Reactions
Our findings suggest that minority equity sponsorship agreements in our study’s context
also lead to negative stakeholder reactions, such as customer and other stakeholder
dissatisfaction. To begin, stakeholders, such as club supporters and media, felt a dissatisfaction
due to excessive sponsor control over clubs. To properly understand their reactions, one has to
understand the history behind these clubs. Most of these clubs have been member-owned for
decades (Wilkesmann and Blutner, 2002). This means the members have been involved in
making key decisions regarding the direction of the club. This has given members an ownership
stake that was successful in creating lifelong bonds between the club and its supporters. As such,
their supporters are reluctant to give up control of what they perceive as their club (Interviewees
3, 22, 24). Moreover, club supporters are leery of any changes to that structure that lessens their
influence. For example, a firm employee (Interviewee 7) stated that in addition to losing direct
influence on club decisions there is a general dislike for corporate involvement by supporters.
Historically, there exists an attitude among supporters that clubs should not be used by wealthy
patrons as a means of gaining status. A club consultant notes:
Club supporters are very reluctant to embrace what I call the corporate ownership
model. (…) Germany has put in place [a] rule to limit company’s involvement. (…) This
rule states that the membership must own 51% of the club.(…) It is a source of constant
agonizing among football supporters. They boycott games. Riot. (…) (Interviewee #18)
The media is also skeptical about potential collusion involved in these minority equity
sponsorship agreements. As discussed above, potential conflicts of interest could emerge as firms
who own (at times controlling) shares in a club also have shares in other Bundesliga clubs. The
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press - which according to some of the interviewers views itself as the “keeper of integrity”
regarding the league - consistently writes about the issue of interlocking ownership. For
example, there is a lot of skepticism about the Volkswagen Group (which includes Audi) that has
ownership stakes in 3 of the 18 league clubs as noted by a stadium employee:
The media also doesn’t like it (…) They think Volkswagen [which owns Audi] has too
much influence. Control. They own parts of two clubs [Ingolstadt, Bayern] and all of one
other (Wolfsburg). When the transfer season starts [selling players] the media is always
waiting for one of their [Audi, Volkswagen] clubs to sell their best players to Bayern
[Audi has a minority stake in].They are ready to jump all over it. (Interviewee #3)
4.4.

Taking Stock of our Findings to Identify Characteristics of Minority Equity
Sponsorship Agreements
Taken together, our findings support our original premise that minority equity

sponsorship agreements are distinct from both traditional sponsorship agreements and from
minority equity-based alliances. In minority equity sponsorship agreements, the sponsoring firm
goes beyond traditional contractual agreements and invests in an organization leading to some
control over the activities of the sponsored organization, while at the same time navigating the
unique structure of these organizations and the scrutiny of their external stakeholders.
-----------------------Insert Table 6 about here
----------------------Overall, our findings provide insights in response to the questions regarding the
motivations, dynamics, and resources exchanged in minority equity sponsorship agreements that
we outlined in Table 1. Accordingly, we present our findings related to these questions and list
the unique characteristics of minority equity sponsorship agreements relative to traditional
sponsorships and minority equity alliances in Table 6. Specifically, we note that the relationship
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structure in these relationships is equity-based and often involves giving a seat to the sponsor on
the board of directors of the club. However, due to institutional pressures and stakeholder
reactions, sponsors are expected to be involved only in high-level decisions and not engaged in
daily operations. Alignment of interests is high particularly due to trust, reputation, reciprocity,
and commitment between key actors, as well as the mutually beneficial nature of these
relationships. As a result of highly aligned regional interests and prior interactions, the prospect
for the duration of minority equity sponsorship agreements is long. Exchanged resources not
only involve direct, tangible, and rational resources, but also include indirect, intangible and
stakeholder-based emotional resources. Compared to traditional sponsorships, firms’ ability to
monitor how their investment is utilized is high. While trust and commitment have been shown
to be key characteristics of minority equity sponsorship agreements in our study, there is still
room for relatively low levels of opportunistic behavior as illustrated by our findings.
5.

Discussion
In this paper, we use a qualitative methodology designed to understand the unique

motivations, dynamics, and resources exchanged in the emerging phenomenon of minority
equity sponsorship agreements, which display similarities to both traditional sponsorships and
minority equity alliances, but are different than both given their unique composition. Despite
prior multidisciplinary research on minority equity alliances (e.g., Devarakonda and Reuer,
2019; Drees et al., 2013) and on traditional sponsorships (Cornwell and Kwon, 2020; Jensen and
Cornwell, 2017; 2021), there is a dearth of attention paid to these agreements in the context of
sponsorships. Our careful analysis of data on this phenomenon undergirded by both exchange
theory and RM revealed the major characteristics of minority equity sponsorship agreements
including motivations, dynamics and resources exchanged in these relations.
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-----------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
----------------------Accordingly, we posit that the themes we identified in our findings are conceptually
related and critical building blocks of a model for forming and maintaining minority equity
sponsorship agreements (Figure 1). Specifically, we find that firms are mainly interested in
minority equity sponsorship agreements in order to have better control over their investment and
to contribute to an attractive environment for employees (i.e., rational motivations), and to
develop positive relations with various stakeholders, including their customers, employees, and
regional political leaders (i.e., emotional motivations). Clubs, on the other hand, are mainly
concerned with securing resources and achieving consistency for continued success through
these long-term relationships (i.e., rational motivations), as well as pleasing various stakeholders
(i.e., emotional motivations). As firms and clubs engage in alliances for different but compatible
reasons, they have to make these relations work by relying on each other’s reputation and
building trust-based relationships, restructuring their respective organizations to accommodate
the partnership, and by committing to a long-term relationship. For firms, minority equity
sponsorship agreements lead to opportunities for networking and marketing-based competitive
advantage, as well as connections to key regional stakeholders. For clubs, these agreements
result in increased financial resources, investments in youth infrastructure, and professionalism.
However, due to institutional pressures including regulations and the necessity of external
investments for competitive success, firms and clubs may engage in opportunistic behaviors such
as investments in multiple clubs and split organizational structures to deceive stakeholders,
which leads to negative stakeholder reactions.
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6.

Implications
Our paper contributes to the literature in multiple ways. To begin, a major contribution of

our study to the rich traditions of research building on exchange theory (McNally and Griffin,
2007) and the RM paradigm (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) involves the stakeholder-related findings
that we identify key to minority equity sponsorship agreements. However, we know from both
sponsorship (e.g., Tsiotsou, 2011) and strategic alliance (e.g., Papadimitriou et al., 2016)
research, that the motivations and consequences of such relationships go beyond the engaged
partners, and also include their respective stakeholders (Dorai and Varshney, 2012). Building on
the literature on the RM paradigm (Cornwell, Howard-Grenville, and Hampel, 2018), we extend
our exploration beyond the dyadic partners in these relationships and find the roles of other key
stakeholders in establishing and maintaining minority equity sponsorship agreements. We find
that minority equity sponsorship agreements feature close ties between investing firm executives,
investee representatives, regional political leaders, as well as other external stakeholders.
Building on our findings, future research could combine research on international sponsorship
networks (Cobbs, 2011) and stakeholders (Laplume et al., 2008) to explore the specific roles of
each of these stakeholders for minority equity sponsorship agreements.
Our findings in particular build on the main premises of exchange theory and offer
unique insights to this line of research. Similarly, we find that interpersonal interactions played a
key role in minority equity sponsorship agreements, which are guided by trust and reciprocity
well-established in this research (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Dwyer et al., 1987; Palmatier
et al., 2006). Moreover, prior research illustrated that exchange relationships are shaped by and
shape the institutional environment in which they take place (Cook and Whitmeyer, 1992).
Accordingly, we find that developing mutually beneficial agreements requires that both investors
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and investees to have an insightful understanding of the institutional context and often involves
the investee to go through structural changes to accommodate this partnership.
Regarding the resources exchanged in minority equity sponsorship agreements, we find
unique mutual benefits of these relationships, such as the increased professionalism of the club
resulting from the engagement and control of the firm in their organizational processes. In other
words, investors’ greater control over their investment also benefits the investee by improving
their organizational processes. This is important, in that it is consistent with the main premise of
exchange theory, which posits that long-term relationships should be mutually beneficial to both
parties and meet their stated objectives (Crompton, 2004). Similarly, extending the research on
consumer responses to sponsorship (e.g., Carrillat and Grohs, 2019) we find that minority equity
sponsorship agreements may also result in negative reactions from stakeholders such as customer
dissatisfaction and negative public perceptions in the region. While these consequences may not
directly affect these organizations’ short-term outcomes, they are expected to impact their longterm performance and future relationships (Koka and Prescott, 2002). Future research adopting a
longitudinal approach could build on our findings and explore how these strategic benefits or
negative stakeholder reactions affect subsequent relations between these organizations.
We also build on and extend the research on minority equity alliances, which suggests
motivations for engaging in these relations include access to resources and collecting information
about the investee (Drees et al., 2013; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2009). We extend this literature, as
our findings point to attracting, recruiting, and retaining highly skilled employees in a region as a
major motivation for minority equity sponsorship agreements. Based on the premise that skilled
employees are key to any major firms’ success and a firm’s location is in turn important for
attracting top-talent (Chapman et al., 2005), we illustrate that firms engage in minority equity
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sponsorship agreements to strengthen the firm’s employee recruitment and retention using a
club’s regional influence and assets. Future research could extend this finding by exploring other
underexplored motivations for initiating and maintaining sponsorships in general, and
specifically for minority equity sponsorship agreements.
We also contribute to the research on sponsorships (Brochado et al., 2018; Cobbs et al.,
2021; Jensen, 2021; Nickell et al., 2011) which called for more research on managerial decisionmaking and on facets of the sponsorship process previously ignored by researchers. To address
these calls for research, we focus on decision-makers in firms and clubs as well as other key
stakeholders (e.g., club consultants, media, lawyers, and club supporters) engaged in minority
equity sponsorship agreements, which is a recent and under-researched phenomenon.
Specifically, we collect and analyze multi-faceted data from Bundesliga wherein minority equity
sponsorship agreements are recently common (Reuters, 2014) and offer insights regarding
motivations, dynamics, and resources exchanged as well as the role of stakeholders in these
relationships. Future research could build on our findings to examine an emerging phenomenon
in which minority equity partnerships are being pursued by private equity, rather than corporate
sponsors (Foerster and Hellier, 2021). Moreover, future research could build on our study to
explore the relationship characteristics of investments from sport organizations to private
companies (such as the National Football League’s investment in DraftKings). Similarly, future
research could explore how needs for additional revenue sources may impact the nature and
complexity of these agreements between a club and multiple minority equity investors.
Finally, our findings contribute to the literature by offering insights regarding the
differences of minority equity sponsorship agreements from traditional sponsorships and
minority equity alliances in a unique economic context (i.e., sponsorship) between non-
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traditional organizations (i.e., firms and clubs) (Devarakonda and Reuer, 2019; Piaskowska,
Nadolska, and Barkema, 2019). Specifically, we review the literature on both traditional
sponsorships and minority equity alliances, compare and contrast these relations among key
characteristics. Moreover, we build on these differences and in light of exchange theory and the
RM paradigm, we identify questions that pertain to unique characteristics of minority equity
sponsorship agreements. Our findings offer important insights in response to these questions and
accordingly we develop a list of major characteristics for these agreements.
7.

Conclusion
The aim of this study was to examine minority equity sponsorships to better understand

the motivation and impacts for both parties involved. As minority equity sponsorship agreements
are growing in popularity, we used the German Bundesliga as the context of our study and
interviewed key actors in minority equity sponsorship agreements to identify a number of key
characteristics of these agreements including the motivations, dynamics, and resources
exchanged by sponsoring firms and clubs. Furthermore, our findings allow a comparison of
traditional sponsorships and minority equity alliances. The findings of this study will hopefully
allow for a better understanding of minority equity sponsorship agreements for sponsoring firms
and the executives of clubs, as well as for other stakeholders and the academic community.
As with any research, this study also has limitations. A potential limitation may be the
generalizability of our findings due to our focus on the German Bundesliga as the context of our
study. However, the German Bundesliga is among the top contexts for sponsorship investments
(Buhler, 2006) and clubs in this league operate as large, multinational, and complex businesses
attracting major investors across industries (e.g., BMW, Puma, Red Bull), making it a good
context for studying interorganizational relationships (Cousens et al., 2006; Moliterno et al.,
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2014). As such, there is abundant business research conducted in this context (e.g., Bartling et
al., 2015; Bauer et al., 2005) offering insights generalizable across industries and geographies.
However, while the majority of our findings are broad and generalizable to all minority equity
sponsorship agreements, some may be unique to our context. For example, a driving factor
behind a number of these relations is the fact that the investor has a significant presence in the
geographic region of the investee, which may not be as salient for other firms or industries.
However, the importance of stakeholders as well as the institutional context has been widely
noted across strategic alliance studies and contexts (Albers et al., 2013; Wassmer, 2010). Having
said that, future research may replicate our findings regarding minority equity sponsorship
agreements in other industries and geographical regions. For instance, the sponsor and sponsee
relationships in college sports and Olympics are different from minority equity sponsorship
agreements due to the highly regulated nature of these non-profit contexts and sponsors’ inability
to take minority equity in return for their investments. However, sponsorship agreements in these
contexts can also be used to advance strategic firm interests as exemplified by the corporate
sponsorships in the Beijing 2008 Olympics (Yang, 2008).
Due to the qualitative and exploratory nature of our inquiry we did not have definitive
data on the size of minority equity sponsorship agreements in the context of our study.
Accordingly, future research could explore if and how the size of the equity stake or the financial
value of the agreement may impact the level of influence that a firm gains in a sport club.
Another limitation to our findings could be related to the emerging consumer and marketing
trends such as social media and data analytics and their implications for B2B marketing
relationships (Jensen, 2021; Mora Cortez, Gilliland, and Johnston, 2019); future research could
explore the implications of these trends for minority equity sponsorship agreements.
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Table 1. Comparing Traditional Sponsorships and Minority Equity Alliances
Traditional Sponsorships

Relationship
Structure

Alignment of
Interest

Duration of
Alliance

Benefits to
Engaged
Parties

Questions about Minority Equity Sponsorship Agreements
in light of Exchange Theory and Relationship Marketing

What is the relationship structure in minority equity
Alliance in which one partner firm holds an equity position in the
sponsorship agreements?
partner firm, or in which both firms hold equity positions in each
Who are the partners in the relationship?
other. (Das and Rahman, 2010)
What kind of characteristics do they look for in a partner?
What are the motivations for each partner to engage in the
Moderate/High. Equity position results in stronger alignment of
Low. The alignment comes only from the contract – an exchange
relationship?
interest. However, degree is dependent on scale of equity position
of payment for marketing resources. (Farrelly and Quester, 2005)
How aligned are these motivations?
and may be one-sided. (Das and Teng, 1996)
What do partners do to further align these interests?
Short. Sponsoring firm is only tied to the entity being sponsored
for the life of the contract (typically 3 to 5 years; McDonald and
How long did the parties intend to maintain the relationship?
Long. The equity position results in an increased commitment
Karg, 2013). While a relationship is developed, both sides have
What is the actual duration of the relationship?
relative to other alliances. (Pangarkar, 2003)
the right to exit the agreement once the contractual relationship
How are the extensions decided and implemented?
ends (Jensen & Cornwell, 2018).

Sponsoring firm pays the entity being sponsored for rights to
leverage the relationship for marketing purposes. (Farrelly and
Quester, 2005)

Moderate. Mainly financial, with research indicating that financial
and performance-based resources are more likely to contribute to
survival of sponsored organization compared to operational
resources (Cobbs et al., 2017).

Effects on
Low. Generally no impact on the composition of Board of
Board of
Directors and Directors. Monitoring is generally purely relational unless detailed
Monitoring
in the contract (Cornwell et al., 2000)
Ability

Trust
Commitment

Minority Equity Alliances

Low/Moderate. Farrelly and Quester (2005) find that trust is
generally present in the sponsorship relationship. However, this
trust is likely more fragile due to the contractual nature of the
relationship.

Moderate/High. Given the lack of equity position, potential for
opportunistic behavior is only limited by the contract and trust
Potential for
between partners. Urriolagoitia and Planellas (2007) argue that
Opportunistic
the potential for opportunistic behavior increases as the level of
Behavior
investments associated with the sponsorship relationship
increases.

Moderate/High. Equity position better aligns interests allowing for
more integration and greater potential benefits than contractual
alliances. However, firms continue to operate separately resulting
in less coordination than joint ventures. (Teng and Das, 2008)

What are the resources exchanged?
What are the implications of these relations on the
stakeholders including customers, supporters, and the local
community?

Moderate/High. The firm taking the equity position likely gains
more ability to monitor. Firms with equity stake often acquire
Board seat(s) on the partner's Board. However, as shown by
Davarakonda and Reuer (2019), the likelihood of a Board seat is
correlated with the size of the equity stake. (Gulati and Singh,
1998)

What are the specific terms of the agreement?
Does the firm get a certain number of seats on the board?

Was the investment tied to certain club infrastructure
Moderate/High. The firm taking the equity position requires more projects?
trust for the partner. However, the degree is dependent on scale of Was the investment part of a regional or global strategy?
equity position. (Das and Teng, 2001)
What is the role of reputation in identifying trustworthy
partners?
Low/Moderate. The equity position results in a lower likelihood
Did the club or firm act opportunistically at any point during
of engaging in opportunistic behavior. However, the degree is
the relationship? How? How did you solve the issue and
dependent on scale of the equity position and may be one sided if
continue the relationship?
only one partner has an equity stake. (Das and Rahman, 2010)
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Table 2. Sources of Interview Data

1
2
3
4

Club employee
Club employee
Stadium employee
Company employee

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Involved in
Minority
Equity
Sponsorship?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

5

Sport management researcher

Yes

No

6

Sport advertising agency employee

No

Yes

7

Company employee

Yes

Yes

8

Former sport marketing employee

Yes

Yes

9

Municipality (city) official

Yes

Yes

Oversees a city that houses a football club with a minority investor;
closely related to each organization and familiar with the relationship

10

Manager of marketing
Sport management researcher in a
German university
Sport management researcher in a
German university

Yes

Yes

Oversees marketing for a major Bundesliga club

Yes

No

Studies sport management in Germany and specializes in sponsorships
in Bundesliga

Yes

No

German professor who studies sport management and specializes in
sponsorships in Bundesliga

No

Interviewee
#

11
12

Interviewee Firm, Club, or
University

Experienced
in the
Industry?

13

Sport management researcher in a
German university

Yes

14

Club employee

Yes

No

15

Sport law attorney

Yes

Yes

16

Club employee

Yes

Yes

17

Club employee

Yes

Yes

18

Club Consultant and Professor

Yes

No

19
20

Company employee
Club consultant

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

21

Sport management researcher in a
German university

No

No

22
23

Club supporter/organizer
Club employee

Yes
Yes

No
Yes

Relevance to Study
Employee of a major Bundesliga club
Employee of a major Bundesliga club
Employee of a stadium for a major Bundesliga club
[Now former] employee of a major shoe and apparel company
Studies organizational structure of European football with work on
minority equity sponsorship agreements. This researcher played an
essential role in helping us establish our initial contacts with German
football clubs.
Worked on advertising campaigns for a major chemical company
involving investments in a major Bundesliga club
Worked for a major German shoe and appearal company
Working knowledge of German sponsorship deals as was involved in
establishing many of these

German professor who studies sport economics and specializes in
sponsorships in Bundesliga. This professor provided background on
the economic and financial consequences of both German football and
the minority equity agreements
Works for a major Bundesliga club
German attorney specilized in sport law and conducted the
negotiations between clubs and firms
Serves as Marketing Manager for a major Bundesliga club, as such he
is very familiar with the clubs arrangements
Serves as Marketing Manager for a major Bundesliga club
Consultant to many clubs and professor who studies sport
management, strategy and marketing
[Now retired] company executive that invested in footbal clubs
Served as a consultant to numerous Bundesliga clubs
German professor who studies sport management and specializes in
sponsorships in Bundesliga. Helped us establish contacts with both
firms and German soccer clubs, also provided essential background
information regarding the relationship between the German soocer
clubs and area firms.
Official organizer of club support for a major Bundesliga club
Long time German sports and business executive
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Table 3. Data Structure
Sponsor

Club

First-order concepts

Second-order themes
Third-order dimensions
Second-order themes
RATIONAL
RATIONAL
Spending investments for long-term impact given long-term duration of the
MOTIVATIONS: LONGMOTIVATIONS: SHORTrelationship
TERM ORIENTED
TERM ORIENTED
MOTIVATIONS FOR
Having better control over how the investment is used by the investee
PRESSURES FOR
PRESSURES FOR CLUBS
ENGAGING IN MINORITY
Attracting and retaining better employees
INVESTORS
EQUITY SPONSORSHIP
EMOTIONAL
EMOTIONAL
AGREEMENTS
Keeping regional stakeholders happy
MOTIVATIONS:
MOTIVATIONS:
Keeping the company regionally engaged across all areas of impact
MAXIMIZING REGIONAL
CONNECTING KEY
Advancing interpersonal interactions with regional leaders and stakeholders
IMPACT OF THE
STAKEHOLDERS OF THE
COMPANY
REGION
Regulations to ensure the stakeholder-orientation of clubs
50+1 rule limiting the control of corporate sponsors
Complying with the requirements of 50+1 rule as an indicator of
commitment displayed by sponsors
Commitment to associate the firm with the team and the sport

MANAGING
INSTITUTIONAL
PRESSURES AND
COMMITTING TO THE
AGREEMENT BY
LIMITING CONTROL

COMMITTING TO THE
AGREEMENT BY
ORGANIZATIONAL
RESTRUCTURING IN LINE
WITH INSTITUTIONAL
PRESSURES
DYNAMICS OF
ESTABLISHING AND
MAINTATINING LONGTERM MINORITY
EQUITY SPONSORSHIP
AGREEMENTS

Seeking for global and reputable clubs for a global sponsor
Searching regional and trustworthy clubs for a sponsor with regional
emphasis
Brand joining the civic trust in the region
Contributes to firm's reputation in the eyes of customers and stakeholders
Previous interactions are used to establish long-term relations

TARGETING LONG-TERM
SPONSORSHIP
AGREEMENTS THROUGH
REPUTATION AND
TRUST

Investments in multiple clubs creating conflict of interests
Capturing too much influence and control over the club despite regulations
Using influence to keep direct competitors outside the club

ACTING
OPPORTUNISTICALLY
FOR SPONSOR BENEFIT

ACTING
OPPORTUNISTICALLY
FOR CLUB SUCCESS

EXCHANGING RATIONAL
RESOURCES WITH
DIRECT BENEFITS TO
THE SPONSOR

EXCHANGING RATIONAL
RESOURCES WITH
DIRECT BENEFITS TO THE
CLUB

Limiting competitors' marketing options
Marketing advantage by being associated with a major club

Getting access to social networks and influence
Associating the brand with a sport and healthy lifestyle

Negative perceptions towards firms that have equity in multiple clubs
Perceptions of cheating when there is transfer of players between clubs
invested by same sponsors
Customer dissatisfaction if they are fans of a rival club

EXCHANGING
EMOTIONAL RESOURCES
WITH INDIRECT
BENEFITS TO THE
SPONSOR
NEGATIVE
STAKEHOLDER
REACTIONS TOWARDS
THE SPONSOR

RESOURCES
EXCHANGED AND
STAKEHOLDER
REACTIONS

ASSOCIATING THE CLUB
WITH REPUTABLE AND
TRUSTWORTHY
SPONSORS TO MAINTAIN
STAKEHOLDER
SATISFACTION

First-order concepts
Navigating the conflict between pressures for long-term impact by
sponsors and short-term flashy transfers from stakeholders and
media
Mimicking the success recipes of other football clubs (herd
mentality/follow the leader)
Serving as the epicenter of interactions for main regional leaders
Achieving community integration
Facilitating interpersonal relationships between various regional
actors
Conflict of running the club as an association versus a non-profit
organization
Complying with the requirements to change structure as an indicator
of commitment displayed by the clubs
Success and professionalization commitment from the club
Bringing new club management to create a new culture and
leadership consistent with the sponsor
Trust to the sponsor regarding how their involvement in the club will
take place
Understanding that the sponsor will only be involved in high-level
strategic issues and not in daily operations
Trust that the regional influence of the sponsor will be wellperceived by the stakeholders of the club
Stakeholders trust and prefer regional sponsors
Shared history leading to shared objectives and future
Creating a vicious cycle: most successful clubs attract most
investors which in turn gives them more resources to be even more
successful
Clubs crossing the fine line of being a non-profit association due to
the value coming from the sponsorship agreement
Getting access to top talent
Investments to the youth academy
Financial resources especially utilized for long-term investments to
talent
Professionalism in the managerial ranks

EXCHANGING
Benefits to the region in turn helping the club
EMOTIONAL RESOURCES
Long-term relationships in the region
WITH INDIRECT
Networking opportunities in the corporate world
BENEFITS TO THE CLUB
NEGATIVE
STAKEHOLDER
REACTIONS TOWARDS
THE CLUB

Club supporters' discomfort towards sponsors' equity ownership in
the club
Club supporters' only accept regional sponsors
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Table 4. Supportive Quotes about Sponsoring Firms
Third-order
dimensions

Second-order themes

Supportive Quotes
I can say that they typically don’t want the money used for players’ salaries. For many clubs that is where the money goes,
but I don’t think that is the thinking behind these investments. More long term investment decisions. One that increase the

RATIONAL MOTIVATIONS:
value of the club over time. (Interviewee#11)
LONG-TERM ORIENTED
PRESSURES FOR INVESTORS

MOTIVATIONS
FOR ENGAGING IN
MINORITY EQUITY
SPONSORSHIP
EMOTIONAL MOTIVATIONS:
AGREEMENTS

Volkswagen is interesting. They sponsor Wolfsburg to give workers and their families something to do. I guess Wolfsburg
is a boring town. (…) A way to keep labor force happy and productive. (Interviewee #18)
It's very, very much focused on the region. So you have, you know, like Allianz, (…) Volkswagen Wolfsburg is highly
regional, Bayern Leverkusen is highly regional, SAP in Hoffenheim is very regional and even like teams where this hasn't
happened but probably will happen at sometime like Stuttgart where they have Mercedes-Benz and so I think it's very
regional. (Interviewee#11)

MAXIMIZING REGIONAL
IMPACT OF THE COMPANY As someone said, different companies have different motivations. Either, help sell more product or help buy more public

trust. I mean, it makes the companies look good to their customers if they promote German football as well. It is a good
investment although I don’t think they (companies) do it with an eye towards a significant financial return. More as a way to
build goodwill. (Interviewee#4)
The association is by the operation of law is not tailored for doing business. It’s for doing nonprofit activities. And now
MANAGING INSTITUTIONAL with the football clubs in former times they were nonprofit organizations. And now let’s say with the upcoming of the TV
rights, the increased value and money coming into the business they’re trying to become companies or businesses.
PRESSURES AND
(Interviewee#15)

COMMITTING TO THE
AGREEMENT BY LIMITING
(...) in Germany, soccer is by far the most popular sport (...) they [firms] try to associate the company with the team. (...)
CONTROL
what we can truly observe for those companies that were the companies by equities that it's really a consistent and

DYNAMICS OF
ESTABLISHING
AND
TARGETING LONG-TERM
MAINTATINING
SPONSORSHIP AGREEMENTS
LONG-TERM
THROUGH REPUTATION AND
MINORITY EQUITY
TRUST
SPONSORSHIP
AGREEMENTS
ACTING
OPPORTUNISTICALLY FOR
SPONSOR BENEFIT

committed relationship that they want to build up. (Interviewee#11)
Depends on what type of company you are and what your target audience is. The sponsorship platform has to match the
marketing goals of the company. Bayern is a global football club. Audi, Adidas and Allianz partner with them to gain a
global audience. That is a different marketing goal than Bayer and Volkswagen have for their investments in Bayer
Leverkusen and Wolfsburg. (Interviewee #18)
They are all different. The bigger the club the bigger sponsors they can get. For smaller clubs they have to rely more on
smaller regional companies. Some (Adidas, Audi) want a global stage to promote their brand. Others just want to be
involved. I do think personal relationships between club owners and management and company executives plays a big role.
(Interviewee#15)
Especially, Audi. They think Volkswagen (which owns Audi) has too much influence. Control. They own parts of two clubs
(Ingolstadt, Bayern) and all of one other (Wolfsburg). When the transfer season starts (selling players) the media is always
waiting for one of their (Audi, Volkswagen) clubs to sell their best players to Bayern (which is also owned by Audi). They
are ready to jump all over it. (Interviewee#3)
Then again, Adidas clearly was trying to keep Nike out when they purchased some of Bayern. So it just depends. Same is
true with Mercedes and Stuttgart. They (Mercedes) wants to keep out Porsche. (Interviewee#2)
One of Audi’s top competitors is BMW. BMW is synonymous with the Bavarian region, where Munich is located. (…) Audi
becomes a sponsor of Bayern Munich which is far and away the most popular football club in Bavaria and all of Germany.
(…) Audi can leverage the Bayern brand to increase sales all over the world. The relationship with the club becomes a very
valuable asset that BMW doesn’t have and can’t easily replicate. (Interviewee #21)

EXCHANGING RATIONAL
RESOURCES WITH DIRECT
BENEFITS TO THE SPONSOR (…) if you have an equity partner and then you want to switch who your corporate sponsor is, (…) let's say that, yeah,

RESOURCES
EXCHANGED AND
STAKEHOLDER
REACTIONS

BMW comes in and they take an equity stake in a club, 10% and then they have like a 5-year sponsorship agreement. At the
end of the 5 years, they want to renegotiate to a new corporate sponsor, how do you phase BMW out now that they have
equity stake in supervisory board seats (Interviewee#12)
I will say that in Europe, football involves politicians in a very social atmosphere. It (football) is our main social institution
in our country and because of that everyone wants to be involved. It is very social for the CEO’s of these companies to be
seen in the boxes at the stadium. That to me had a lot to do with these alliances. The companies get access to the club and
EXCHANGING EMOTIONAL
that is important for both commercial and personal reasons. (Interviewee#17)

RESOURCES WITH INDIRECT
BENEFITS TO THE SPONSOR

If you visit Bayer’s website they use their investment in the football club as a catalyst for a larger health and wellness
initiative. Which again, is all about the company creating a better work environment for their employees. That could
certainly be used as an advantage over their competitors. (Interviewee#20)
The media also doesn’t like it. The newspapers. Especially, Audi. They think Volkswagen (which owns Audi) has too much
NEGATIVE STAKEHOLDER
influence. Control. They own parts of two clubs (Ingolstadt, Bayern) and all of one other (Wolfsburg). When the transfer
REACTIONS TOWARDS THE
season starts (selling players) the media is always waiting for one of their (Audi, Volkswagen) clubs to sell their best
SPONSOR
players to Bayern (which is also owned by Audi). They are ready to jump all over it. (Interviewee#3)
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Table 5. Supportive Quotes about Sponsored Organizations
Third-order
dimensions

MOTIVATIONS
FOR ENGAGING IN
MINORITY EQUITY
SPONSORSHIP
AGREEMENTS

Second-order themes

Supportive Quotes

Borussia Dortmund, from the Germany's rust belt Ruhr valley region, is seen as the only German club in a position to
currently challenge the dominance of Bayern Munich. (...) Dortmund may be taking a page from rival Bayern's playbook in
seeking more corporate backing. German insurer Allianz in February took an 8.33 percent stake in Bayern Munich for 110
million euros as part of a deal to help the club pay down debts on its stadium and to sponsor a youth academy. The deal at
RATIONAL MOTIVATIONS:
the time gave the unlisted club, which is majority controlled by its members, an implied valuation of 1.32 billion euros (1.07
SHORT-TERM ORIENTED
billion pound), more than five times Dortmund's market value of 250 million (Reuters, 2014)

PRESSURES FOR CLUBS

Find players, scout them, develop them. That takes resources. You have to remember here if you finish at the bottom of the
table you get relegated. Demoted. (…) You are under pressure not just from the fans and media (…) but also with the fear of
dropping down to the lower leagues. (Interviewee#21)
Wolfsburg’s deal with Volkswagen is different as is Ingolstadt and Audi. They are both based in the small communities. The
football clubs are part of the fabric of those small cities. Bayer and Leverkusen go back 100 years. They started as

EMOTIONAL MOTIVATIONS:
worker’s clubs. So the players were workers from the company. (Interviewee#1)
CONNECTING KEY
STAKEHOLDERS OF THE
Red Bull invests because they want to break into the German market. It seems like ownership is a Red Bull strategy as it
REGION
relates to their sports sponsorships. In my opinion, the common denominator as far as the corporate investment goes is
keeping stakeholders groups happy. (Interviewee#16)

COMMITTING TO THE
AGREEMENT BY
ORGANIZATIONAL
RESTRUCTURING IN LINE
WITH INSTITUTIONAL
PRESSURES

DYNAMICS OF
ESTABLISHING
AND
MAINTATINING
LONG-TERM
ASSOCIATING THE CLUB
MINORITY EQUITY WITH REPUTABLE AND
SPONSORSHIP
TRUSTWORTHY SPONSORS
TO MAINTAIN
AGREEMENTS
STAKEHOLDER
SATISFACTION

(...) they are hosting these meetings more like meetings in companies where you set strategic goals, where you provide a
vision to those who support you to give really guidance to implement a culture of that the team wants to stand for. (...) it's
the whole kind of guidance and leadership as part of the management that they bring in. (Interviewee#12)
Henning Vöpel, a senior economist with the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI), told DW that German
clubs were following a global trend in professional football. "The number of associations operating like a traditional sports
club is in decline. They are changing their legal status to become more competitive and tap news sources of financing," (...)
Unlike their "big money" rivals, current first division clubs Augsburg, Mainz, Freiburg and Paderborn are still organized
along traditional lines. As registered football associations, their fortunes, however, will remain bleak. (DW, 2014)

(...) it’s long-term. I mean Wolfsburg and Bayern that’s additional because it was a club from the company. It was a
company club, so the company started the club. Like universities have their own university teams. The company had a
company team with employees playing there. And then it developed, and then certainly the company supported the team, and
then the tradition started and then they bought professional players and so. (Interviewee#15)
And I mean sure, so it's the recruitment first and the second thing is trust that those meetings not like if you have a club
meeting. So it's required for the club to have one meeting for a year and it's usually organized very democratically,
everyone can raise a voice and lot of discussions and lots of small things happening. (Interviewee#12)
The association is by the operation of law is not tailored for doing business. It’s for doing nonprofit activities. And now

ACTING
with the football clubs in former times they were nonprofit organizations. And now let’s say with the upcoming of the TV
OPPORTUNISTICALLY FOR
rights, the increased value and money coming into the business they’re trying to become companies or businesses.
CLUB SUCCESS
(Interviewee#15)

(...) the overall strategy is to make sure that the brand they associate with the sports team act professionally. So, because
those companies have high management skills, and you know in Germany, a lot of decisions are left to the clubs themselves,
and the club's structure itself is an old structure (…) they just want to make sure that they have control over what I call,
"Management Skills," inside the teams and the clubs. (Interviewee#12)

EXCHANGING RATIONAL
RESOURCES WITH DIRECT
BENEFITS TO THE CLUB

RESOURCES
EXCHANGED AND
STAKEHOLDER
REACTIONS

I think the company’s offer tremendous professionalism. In Bayern’s case the club operates very efficiently. Some of the
things they are doing are quite revolutionary in sport management. Now maybe you can say “Yes, but they are one of the
richest clubs in the world.” But I would say that the other – not so rich – clubs the investments are a form of
professionalism. (Interviewee#20)
It is a different mindset regarding these investments. These investments are over and above their sponsorships. (...) At
some point, probably in the 1980’s and 1990’s the company realized they had a valuable asset of their hands. Not in a
financial way. (...) They transformed into professional sport clubs. (...) Those companies invest because they want the
benefit of association with a great club. (...) these investments have allowed the clubs to act in a more professional manner.
(Interviewee#15)
We have had a longstanding relationship with Daimler. The company has been a sponsor for years. (…) Volkswagen owns

EXCHANGING EMOTIONAL Wolfsburg, Audi has investments in Ingolstadt and Bayern. So it makes sense for the area’s biggest employer to make an
RESOURCES WITH INDIRECT investment in the region’s top club. In many of these arrangements fans don’t like corporate investment in the clubs. (…)
but most supporters were comfortable with Daimler. (…) They have offices right across the street from the club’s stadium.
BENEFITS TO THE CLUB
(Interviewee #21)
If the questions is regarding the supporters then I think they understand both party’s needs. Now, some don’t like

NEGATIVE STAKEHOLDER
corporations buying their teams, but I think they understand the benefits of it. (…) The media is also wary of these
REACTIONS TOWARDS THE
relationships. Most of our clubs have been membership based for years and years. Any changes to that established way of
CLUB
running the club is looked at negatively or at least some caution. (Interviewee#12)
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Table 6. Summary of Findings
Questions about Minority Sponsorship Agreements

Relationship
Structure

Findings
The investing firm gets a minority ownership in the club and a seat
in the board with minor involvement in club operations
What is the relationship structure in minority equity
Firms headquartered in a region invests in a local and reputable
sponsorship agreements?
club
Who are the partners in the relationship?
Partners are mostly clubs in the region
What kind of characteristics do they look for in a partner?
"Member association" designation
Separating football and other operations of the club

Alignment of
Interest

Achieve stakeholder satisfaction in the region
What are the motivations for each partner to engage in the Develop or maintain interpersonal relations with key stakeholders
relationship?
Associating the brand with the most popular sport
How aligned are these motivations?
Employee recruitment and retention
What do partners do to further align these interests?
Mimicking other clubs
Reputation advantage for sponsors and financial support for clubs

Duration of
Alliance

How long did the parties intend to maintain the
relationship?
What is the actual duration of the relationship?
How are the extensions decided and implemented?

Benefits to
Engaged
Parties

What are the resources exchanged?
What are the implications of these relations on the
stakeholders including customers, supporters, and the
local community?

Effect on
Board of
What are the specific terms of the agreement?
Directors and
Does the firm get a certain number of seats on the board?
Monitoring
Ability

Trust and
Commitment

Was the investment tied to certain club infrastructure
projects?
Was the investment part of a regional or global strategy?
What is the role of reputation in identifying trustworthy
partners?

Potential for Did the club or firm act opportunistically at any point
Opportunistic during the relationship? How? How did you solve the
Behavior
issue and continue the relationship?

Characteristics of Minority Equity Sponsorship Agreements
Sponsoring firms take equity position in the entity being
sponsored.
Firm control in the club is limited by regulations; they are
only involved in high-level decisions.

High. While the benefits received from the agreement and
resources exchanged are significantly different, both have
incentive to see the other succeed. There is a strong alignment
of benefits.

Long. Sponsoring firm ties itself to the entity being sponsored
Assessing congruence between marketing goals and club reputation
indefinitely.
Long-term stability and professionalism for clubs
Investments in youth academies for ensuring long-term success
The sponsoring firm becomes tied in to the long-term plans of
Long-term investments to the region not just to the club
the sponsored entity due to the equity stake and other aspects
Trust, reputation, and commitment as pillars of the relationship
of the relationship.
Utilizing these investments for attracting human capital
Furthering political ties and establishing new
High. Many additional strategic benefits including
connections/networking
professionalism, investments to infrastructure, connections,
Reputation and marketing
reputation, and attracting human capital.
Financial resources
New level of professionalism for clubs
Better control on investment alternatives
Sponsor gets a seat on the club's board
50+1 rule (i.e., control remains in the club)
Organizational restructuring from a member association to a public
holding company

High. Sponsoring firm often has at least one seat on the Board
of Directors for the entity being sponsored.
The sponsoring firm gains more access and input to the
decisions made by sponsored firm.

Money used for long-term investments instead of player salaries
Personal relationships play an important role
Regional history and prior interactions are key
Establishing a regional 'civic trust'

High. Sponsors make commitments for the long-term
infrastructure of the club. Trust is established based on
interpersonal interactions and previous ties.

Separating club and football operations to capitalize on the
commercial opportunities of football
Conflict of interests due to investments in multiple clubs

Low. Relationship is maintained based on long-term
commitment and trust between partners. There are some
instances of opportunistic behavior displayed by either party.
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model
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Appendix A. Interview Guide*
1. What is sponsorship? How do you utilize sponsorships for your company?
a. How are they initiated and maintained?
b. Who is responsible? How do you measure its efficiency?
i. Follow up: How do you choose your sponsorship partners?
c. Can you tell me about your current sponsorship agreements?
d. How do you decide on these sponsorships?
i. Follow up: Do you adopt the same sponsorship strategies in other
countries or is it just limited to Germany? Why?
e. What is the role of various stakeholders for these sponsorship agreements?
i. Follow up: Role of governments?
ii. Follow up: Role of customers? Other stakeholders?
2. Let’s focus on your sponsorships involving equity now. Can you tell me more about
them?
i. Follow up: What was the rationale for your firm’s investments in football
clubs?
b. How do they work? How are they initiated and maintained?
i. Follow up: Who are the partners in the relationship? How do you pick
them?
ii. Follow up: What is the role of reputation in identifying trustworthy
partners?
iii. Follow up: What is the relationship structure?
iv. Follow up: How long did you intend the relationship to last?
c. What do you offer to the club and what do you receive in return?
i. Follow up: Did the club act opportunistically at any point during the
relationship? How? How did you solve the issue and continue the
relationship?
d. Was the investment tied to certain club infrastructure projects?
i. Follow up: Does the firm get a certain number of seats on the board?
e. What are the implications of these relations on the firm / on customers / on
supporters of the club / on the community?
i. Follow up: Were there any adverse impacts of the relationship?
f. Was the investment part of a regional or global strategy?
i. Follow up: Would they invest in non-German football clubs?

* Interview guide was slightly revised for different interviewees (e.g., club representatives, other key
stakeholders).

